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THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S UNDERTAKING
WILLIAM E. WALLACE*

In earlier articles I have discussed problems dealing with the enunciation and expression of listing agreements, their formal import'
important segment of many of the attendant
and the effect of one
"payment" clauses.2 The former article concerned- itself with the
general problem of the relationship existing between a real property
owner and his broker, while the latter dealt with the significance of
words by which the payment clause of a brokerage agreement was
introduced and with the effect of a wrongful default by the landowner. The present article will consider the legal significance of
the actual terms employed to designate the act of acceptance required of the broker before he is entitled to a commission. 3 Inasmuch
as statement of an outside event expressed in a commission payment
clause is commonly characterized as stating a condition precedent
to a valid claim for commission, and is, in effect at least, treated as
a part of the broker's undertaking,4 use of terms in such context will
be commingled unless the discussion expressly indicates otherwise.
I. THE BROKERAGE RELATIONSHIP-"GENERAL" LISTING

At one time almost the solitary form of listing agreement, the
"general" listing no longer enjoys such prominence. As real estate
brokers have become better organized and as court decisions have
demonstrated shortcomings in this arrangement from the broker's
standpoint, new forms have taken over in many instances. Neverthe-

less, this form is the historical seed from which the more formal
listing agreements of today and the legal climate surrounding all
brokerage agreements developed. And the "general" listing is still
employed today, albeit in a declining number of transactions. Thus,
discussion of the relationship of the parties growing out of this
arrangement and of the broker's untaking in such an agreement provides a logical starting point for this discussion.
In making formal the broker's undertaking in this situation, the
courts have coined the catch-line that a broker has earned his
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University; member, Iowa Bar
Ass'n.

1. Wallace, Promissory Liability Under Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 37

L. REv. 350 (1952); Wallace, Real Estate Brokerage Contracts (unpublished thesis in Univ. of Michigan Law Library).
IOWA

2. Wallace, Effect of Qualifying Listing Language on Real Estate Brokers'

Commissions; Obligation of a Listing Property Owner, 1957 WASH. U.L.Q. 297.
3. Some terms of obvious import were discussed in the latter article. Id. at
348.
4. Ibid.
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commission when he finds a purchaser ready, able and willing to
purchase the property on the terms stipulated by the owner. 5 A
formal, personal introduction of purchaser to owner is not necessary
if the broker was in fact the procuring cause of the transaction-the
one who in fact induced the purchaser to negotiate.6 Notice of the
fact that the broker has rendered the preliminary service and has
merely turned the purchaser over to the owner for completion of the
transaction is generally not required.7 Nor is the commission defeated by the fact that the broker was not present at the closing of
the transaction 8 or that the closing terms differed from those stated
in the original authority.9 If the broker effects a contract which
is, mutually binding upon owner and purchaser, he has earned his
commission regardless of a subsequent refusal or inability of the
purchaser to carry out his contract. 10 If he does not effect a contract,
but merely produces a purchaser ready, able and willing, and the
transaction is not consummated, he must be prepared to show that
the failure to complete the sale was not occasioned either by his own
fault or by that of his purchaser." While it is generally stated that
a broker must meet all the terms of his employment, substantial
compliance will satisfy the courts. 12 Though material deviation from
the terms of the authority will defeat a commission, a minor
variance is not fatal.'3 Any transaction effected by a broker must
be completed within the time stated in the agreement, or, if no time
is stated, within a reasonable time.14 If the broker fails to complete
the negotiations within the time specified, he cannot recover although
a subsequent sale is in fact made to a prospect introduced to the
owner by the broker, provided the owner did not impede consum5. 2 MEcEm, AGENCY § 2430 (2d ed. 1914). See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 380
(1947).
6. 2 MECHEm, AGENCY § 2435 (2d ed. 1914). See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.
716 (1934).
7. Ranney v. Rock, 135 Conn. 479, 66 A.2d 111 (1949); Jordon v. Hilbert,
131 Me. 56, 158 Atl. 853 (1932). See generally Annot., 142 A.L.R. 275 (1943).
8. Corleto v. Prudential Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 612, 70 N.E.2d 702 (1947).
9. See generally Annots., 43 A.L.R. 1103 (1926); 47 A.L.R. 855 (1927); 128
A.L.R. 430 (1940).
10. United States Farm Land Co. v. Darter, 42 Cal. App. 292, 183 Pac. 696
(1919) (purchaser insolvent); Church v. Johnson, 93 Iowa 544, 61 N.W. 916
(1895) (purchaser acting ultra vires); Russo v. Slawsby, 276 Mass. 126, 176
N.E. 794 (1931) (solvency assumed); Groose v. Cooley, 43 Minn. 188, 45
N.W. 15 (1890). 2 MEcHEM, AGENCY § 2448 (2d ed. 1914).
11. 2 MEcHEm, AGENCY §§ 2440-41 (2d ed. 1914). See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1390
(1927); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 926 (1931).

12. Orr v. Warner & Frame, 149 Ill. App. 539 (1909); Meyers v, Kilgen,
177 Mo. App. 724, 160 S.W. 569 (1913). See cases cited note 13 infra.

13. Buckner v. Tweed, 157 F.2d 211 (App. D.C. 1946); Jacobs v. Rothschild,

200 Okla. 599, 197 P.2d 951 (1948).
14. Contra, Hartford v. McGillicuddy, 103 Me. 224, 68 Atl. 860 (1907); cf.
Granata v. Mothner, 44 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), which provides that
a contract to sell real estate that fixes no duration shall be deemed void after
one year. See Sawyer v. Federal Land Bank, 135 Me. 137, 190 Atl. 731 (1937).
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mation by the broker within the specified time,15 or waive the term
by approval of further actions by the broker after the term.1 6 If the
purchaser is in fact found within the time stated, it is immaterial
that the sale was not made within the time, provided the purchaser
was ready, able and willing at that time and only the actual transfer
of deeds remained.'7 The fact that notice of the finding of a purchaser
is not given to the owner within the time stated is not fatal except
in the rare instance of a sale by the owner personally between the
expiration date and receipt of the notice.'8 There must, however,
be an actual finality in the purchaser's mind, not merely an opening
of negotiations.

II. SALE,

SOLD, TO SELL, NEGOTIATE A SALE, EFFECT A SALE

In a recent case the Missouri Court of Appeals has formulated the
following definition:
The term "sale" has no fixed or invariable meaning, but is to be interpreted in accordance with the manifest intention of the parties....
A sale ordinarily is defined as a contract to transfer property rights for
money paid or promised to be paid, but the term is broad enough to include the transfer of property for any sort of valuable consideration....
A sale of real property contemplates a consideration or price, a seller, a
19
purchaser, transfer of property rights and a delivery of the thing sold.

Only a short time earlier the same court had held where a contract
of sale had been entered into between a landowner and a purchaser
"there was a sale of the property ... and it is immaterial that the
contract was not consummated until after [the listing period].120
Similar expressions are commonplace in analogous decisions from
many other jurisdictions. 21 But these statements give little insight
15. 2 MEcHEm, AGENCY §§ 2427, 2439 (2d ed. 1914).
16. Stiewell v. Lally, 89 Ark. 195, 115 S.W. 1134 (1909); Isaac v. Dronet,
31 So.2d 299 (La. App. 1947); Dickson v. Kelley, 193 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946). On waiver generally, see 2 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 2439 (2d ed. 1914);
Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1019 (1942).
17. Owens v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 50 Wyo. 331, 63 P.2d 1006
(1936); 2 McnEm,AGENCY § 2439 (2d ed. 1914); Annot., 26 A.L.R. 784 (1923).
18. Baars v. Hyland, 65 Minn. 150, 67 N.W. 1148 (1896).
19. Schulte v. Crites, 300 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. App. 1957); cf. Lewis v.
Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 (1945).
20. Doerflinger Realty Co. v. Fields, 281 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. App. 1955),
relying on Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S.W. 257 (1914).
21. See, e.g., Betz v. Williams & White Land & Loan Co., 46 Kan. 45, 26 Pac.
456 (1891); Fieldman v. Thomas, 10 N.J. Misc. 48, 157 Atl. 554 (Sup. Ct. 1931)
where the court found that the broker had already earned his commission
under the brokerage agreement involved ("sale" met by a contract of sale)
and could not be defeated by the owner's release of the purchaser; Real
Estate Co. v. Cavazza, 174 Pa. Super. 19, 98 A.2d 486 (1953); Lewis v. Dahl,
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 (1945). See Wallace, supra note 2, at 306 & nn.
38 & 39. Compare Rice-Wray v. Palma, 216 Mich. 324, 185 N.W. 841 (1921)
(undertaking met and commission immediately payable upon securing of
written contract of sale although the purchaser's payments thereunder were
deferred).
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into the legal content of the term. Under the rationale quoted above,
a "contract of sale" will suffice. But what constitutes a "contract of
sale" for these purposes? Suppose conditions to the purchaser's performance are expressed, or the "contract" contains an "escape"
clause? What is the effect of an option? Suppose a liquidated damage
or forfeiture of deposit provision is included? Suppose the employment is to "negotiate" a sale? Will anything other than an express
written "contract" suffice?
Answers to the first three questions require little discussion. Contracts for the purchase and sale of real estate are usually considered
as falling within the applicable Statute of Frauds. Therefore, a
broker securing only the oral agreement of a proposed purchaser has
The simple "black letter" distinction between a broker's undertaking cast
in terms of effectuation of a sale and that involved where a broker is employed simply to procure a purchaser commonly utilized in brokerage opinions
is concisely stated in Melvin v. West, 107 So.2d 156, 160 (Fla. 1958) as follows:
"Two types of brokerage contracts are generally used in the business
of selling real estate. Under the first type, the seller employs a real
estate broker to procure a purchaser for the property, and the broker
becomes entitled to his commission, when he produces a purchaser who
is ready, able and willing to purchase the property upon the terms and
conditions fixed by the seller, leaving to the seller the actual closing of
the sale. Under the second type, the seller employs a broker to effect a
sale of the property, and the broker, to become entitled to his commission,
must not only produce a purchaser who is ready, able and willing to
purchase the property upon the terms and conditions fixed by the seller
but must actually effect the sale, or procure from the purchaser a binding
contract of purchase upon the terms and conditions affixed by the seller."
Listings requiring a broker "to sell" the listed property are treated the
same way. See, e.g., Menton v. Melvin, 330 Mass. 355, 113 N.E.2d 447 (1953);
Eisenberger v. Ziehler, 116 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio App. 1951). In Glentworth v.
Luther, 21 Barb. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 145 (1853), it was said,
"[A] broker ...

to sell real estate ....

in the nature of things . . . can do

nothing more than find a party who will be acceptable to the owner and
enter into a contract of purchase with him; unless the owner makes him
more than a broker merely, by giving him a power of attorney to convey
the property .... "
In considering this statement, it must be born in mind that New York law
treats the broker as a mere middleman. See Habib v. Caputo, 168 Misc. 202,
5 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1938).
Although many cases in which the opinions use the phrase "employment
to sell" find that a broker has earned the commission when he has secured a
purchaser "ready, willing and able" to purchase on the owner's terms, it is
submitted they do not render erroneous the "rule" stated above. Rather, it is
believed such phraseology is used in a common, non-technical sense indicating
merely a general method of listing.
Although the Alabama court had earlier stated that a "to sell" listing requirement was met when the owner and purchaser entered a contract of
sale, DeBriere v. Yeend Bros. Realty Co., 204 Ala. 647, 86 So. 528 (1920),
that court has since indicated that such is not required-that
"While there is a distinction between contracts by which a broker is
employed to procure a purchaser for property and contracts by which he
is employed to effect a sale or to sell, the rule in this jurisdiction is that
brokers employed under the latter type of contract, as well as those
employed under the first mentioned type, are entitled to their compensation when they have procured a purchaser ready, able and willing to
perform the terms specified .

So.2d 709, 714 (1951).

. . ."

Penny v. Speak, 256 Ala. 359, 54
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Nor has a "sale" been effected when the
not secured a "sale."
"contract" provides a mechanism by which the purchaser may
escape performance. In such a case no "binding" contract has been
negotiated.23 Similarly, if only an option to buy or a contract which
includes conditions to the purchaser's obligation has been secured,
no "transfer of property rights" has taken place and no "sale" has
been effected 2 4 Of course, whether a particular situation involves
only an option to buy rather than a contract may become a thorny
problem, as may determination of the absolute or conditional nature
of the purchaser's promise.25 Such considerations, however, are out22. The decisions most emphatically enunciating the proposition seem to
be those in which the court has drawn a clear distinction between the requirement present in a simple "find a purchaser ready, willing and able" listing
and that in which the broker is "to sell" the listed property. See, e.g.,
Knowles v. Henderson, 156 Fla. 31, 22 So.2d 384 (1945); Long v. Thompson,
73 Kan. 76, 84 Pac. 552 (1906); Duncan v. Barbour, 188 Va. 53, 49 S.E.2d 260
(1948). See especially Owens v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 50 Wyo. 331,
63 P.2d 1006 (1936) discussing cases from many jurisdictions. Contra, Grinde
v. Chipman, 175 Wis. 376, 185 N.W. 288 (1921); cf. Penny v. Speak, supra
note 21.
The Iowa decisions on this matter reflect the varying viewpoints. For a
detailed discussion, and citation of the pertinent decisions, and the ultimate
conclusion that a contract of sale constitutes a "sale" for brokerage purposes,
see Nagl v. Small, 159 Iowa 387, 138 N.W.. 849 (1912).
But, if the broker is not expressly empowered to execute a binding contract to sell, and a "sale" or "to sell" listing is not interpreted as giving such
authority, what more can he do than secure a purchaser ready, willing and
able to buy on the property owner's terms? Should the owner's failure, for
whatever reason, to execute a contract with such a purchaser mean that the

broker is not entitled because he has not secured a "sale"? To raise the ques-

tion would seem to provide a clear-cut answer in the negative. For a discussion of the "co-operation" required of a listing property owner, see Wallace,
supranote 2, at 310-313, 320-327, 349.
23. Jacobson v. Rotzien, 111 Minn. 527, 127 N.W. 419, affd on rehearing,111
Minn. 527, 127 N.W. 856 (1910).
24. See, e.g., Christenson v. Duborg, 38 Nev. 404, 150 Pac. 306 (1915);
McMurry v. Mercer, 73 S.W.2d 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922); cf. Crowell v. Parker, 171 N.C. 392,
88 S.E. 497 (1916). The significance of an option has been well stated thus:
"An option is not a sale of property, but a sale of a right to purchase....
Or, stated in another form, it is a right acquired by contract to accept or
reject a present offer, within a limited or reasonable time in the future."
Seeburg v. El Royale Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 1, 128 P.2d 362, 363 (1942).
See Real Estate Co. v. Cavazza, 174 Pa. Super. 19, 98 A.2d 486 (1953)
expressly considering the distinction between a purchaser's conditional and
unconditional acceptance of a property owner's offer. The Texas Supreme
Court has evinced dissatisfaction with the rule thus broadly stated. That
court insisted that if the proposed purchaser were ready, able and willing to
buy and the owner had a defective title, the broker had earned the promised
commission although no binding contract had been executed. Hamburger &
Dreyling v. Thomas, 103 Tex. 280, 126 S.W. 561 (1910). See note 78; text
supported by notes 76-78 infra.
25. But see McMillan v. Philadelphia Co., 159 Pa. 142, 144, 28 Atl. 220
(1893):
"The distinction between option and a contract of sale . . .is broad
and plain. An option is an unaccepted offer. It states the terms and
conditions on which the owner is willing to sell ... , if the holder elects
to accept them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect, he
must give notice to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon
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side the scope of this discussion.
When we come to the "liquidated damages" question, we find a
divergence of opinion. The opposing rationales can perhaps best be
presented by setting forth the pertinent language of two nineteenth
century opinions dealing with the effect of a provision for liquidated
damages. In Leete v. Norton26 a broker had been employed to secure
a "sale or exchange." He secured a contract of exchange which
specified a sum as liquidated damages. The Connecticut court, in
finding that the broker was entitled to a commission, said,
Now though the plaintiff has not effected a sale or exchange of defendant's property, yet he has negotiated a contract for such exchange, agreed
to by the defendant, in which contract a sum of money is specified which
the defendant agrees to accept, and in consideration of which to relieve
[plaintiff] from his obligation to make exchange of properties. Having
thus fixed on the sum... as equivalent for the performance of this contract to exchange his property, as between himself and his co-contractor,
the defendant cannot be allowed to deny that that sum of money is an
equivalent, as between himself and the plaintiff, by whose aid he made
the contract. 27

It will be noted that the court did not find that a "sale or exchange"
was secured by such a contract; such a relationship had not been
created between the property owner and purchaser. But, for purposes
of the earning of brokerage, the liquidated damages provision was
considered the "equivalent of performance."
On the other hand, the Missouri Court of Appeals expressly rejected
the apparent reasoning of the Leete decision when it said in Reiger v.
Bigger,8
I think that the decision of that case (Leete v. Norton] was wrong. The
broker was employed to make an absolute and unconditional sale or exchange of the property; the contract of exchange as made was conditional,
so as to relieve the other party to the contract from completing the
exchange on the payment of [a stated sum]. There was no evidence that
the broker's principal accepted the contract which was made as performance by the broker of his obligation under his contract. It is true that
becomes a valid and binding contract. If an acceptance is not made
within the time fixed, the owner is no longer bound by his offer, and the
option is at an end. A contract of sale or lease fixes definitely the relative
rights and obligations of both parties at the time of its execution. The
offer and acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the contracting
parties meet in the terms of the agreement."
Carver v. Britt, 241 N.C. 538, 85 S.E.2d 888 (1955) contains a good discussion,
with authorities, of what is necessary to cause a purchaser's acceptance of a
property owner's offer to be unconditional.
26. 43 Conn. 219 (1875).
27. Id. at 226. See Gilder v. Davis, 137 N.Y. 504, 33 N.E. 600 (1893) ("If in
such a case the employer wishes to be exempt from the payment of commissions, or to confine the commissions to the amount of the liquidated damages
paid in lieu of performance, he should stipulate for such exemption in the
contract with his broker").
28. 29 Mo. App. 421 (1888).
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the principal accepted and approved the conditional contract .... But
how can such fact be held to constitute an acceptance by the principal of
the contract made as performance by the broker of his contract? The contract made was not the contract which the broker was employed to
make .... The argument, that the principal, having fixed upon the sum
of... as an equivalent for the performance of the contract of exchange,
thereby accepted the contract as performance by the broker of his
contract, which required him to effect such exchange, is plausible but not
sound. Although the principal, by the terms of the contract, agreed to
receive such sum as an equivalent for the exchange, there was nothing to
indicate that he considered such sum as an equivalent in fact for the
exchange. The principal may have approved the contract for various
reasons, other than the opinion that the sum mentioned was an equivalent
to him for the exchange, such, for instance, as the inability of his broker
to procure any other contract, or the belief that the sum, although not a
full equivalent to him for the exchange, was sufficient to induce the other
party to complete the exchange. But even if he did consider and accept
such sum as such equivalent, as between himself and the other party to
the contract, what was there to indicate that he accepted said sum as
such equivalent as between himself and the broker. The broker having
contracted to make an absolute and unconditional sale or exchange, his
principal had the right to hold him to the contract.2 9
In other words, the Reiger court, similarly separating the brokerage
agreement from the contract of sale, felt that the provision for
liquidated damages made the agreement only "conditional" or a mere
"option." Thus, the Leete reasoning was considered invalid.
But are the Leete and Reiger cases really at odds? The Leete
language certainly provides basis for such a conclusion. But subsequent cases from Connecticut itself,30 as well as from other courts
relying on the Leete decision,31 indicate that the "equivalent" rule
actually obtains only where the agreement obtained is capable of
specific performance notwithstanding the liquidated damages provision.32 Thus, the Texas court has stated the true consideration as

follows,
The principle which controlsis well settled. It is thus stated: "The question always is: What is the contract? Is it that one certain act shall be
done, with a sum annexed, whether by way of penalty or damages, to
secure the performance of this very act? Or is it that one of two things
shall be done at the election of the party who has to perform the contract,
namely, the performance of the act or the payment of the sum of money?
If the former, the fact of the penal or other like sum being annexed will
not prevent the court enforcing the performance of the very act, and thus
29. Id. at 429.
30. E.g., McHugh v. Bock, 134 Conn. 519, 58 A.2d 740 (1948).
31. Davis v. Roseberry, 95 Kan. 411, 148 Pac. 629 (1915); Parker v. Estabrook, 68 N.H. 349, 44 Atl. 484 (1895); cf. Smith v. Bretschneider, 97 N.H. 117,
81 A.2d 843 (1951).
32. See Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900). But see Parker
v. Estabrook, 68 N.H. 349, 44 Atl. 484 (1895).
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carrying into execution the intention of the parties. If the latter, the
contract is satisfied by the payment of a sum of money, and there is no
ground for proceeding against the party having the election, to compel
the performance of the other alternative." Fry on Specific Performance,
§ 115. See also 36 Cyc. 571, 572. Whether a contract belongs to one class
or the other depends on the intention deduced from a proper construction
33
of the instrument in which the parties have expressed their agreement.

Care must be observed, however, in interpreting analogous decisions. For example, in McNeil v. McLain34 the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals said "there is no necessity for us to consider whether or not
the contract was capable of specific performance by the [owners]."
At first blush this would seem contrary to the above stated conclusion.
But the brokerage provision is found in the agreement executed by
the owner and purchaser and is qualified by the phrase "for negotiating this sale." Thus, a "proper construction" would seem clearly
to indicate that the property owner acknowledged the agreement as
satisfaction of the broker's undertaking.35 Similarly, where the property owner accepts a purchaser's agreement which gives the owner
an option of demanding specific performance or declaring a forfeiture
of deposit, the broker has earned a commission. 36 Conversely, the
fact that the purchaser cannot secure specific performance from the
property owner is of no consequence.37
Under this "contract will do" rationale, will anything other than a
written contract of sale satisfy a "sale" undertaking? As has been
pointed out above, neither an option nor a conditional acceptance of
a property owner's offer will suffice. Suppose the property placed
with a broker for sale is disposed of by condemnation? Suppose a
purchaser had been found and condemnation was used to clear title
to the property involved? These two situations were expressly
33. Stevens v. Karr, 119 Tex. 479, 488, 33 S.W.2d 725, 728 (1930) quoting
from Redwine v. Hudman, 104 Tex. 21, 24, 133 S.W. 426, 428 (1911); cf. Hart
v. Warder, 57 N.M. 14, 252 P.2d 515 (1953) (personal property); R. J. Caldwell Co. v. Connecticut Mills Co., 255 App. Div. 270, 232 N.Y. Supp. 625
(1929), aff'd 251 N.Y. 565, 168 N.E. 429 (1929). See also Hatch v. Strebeck,
58 N.M. 824, 277 P.2d 317 (1954); Cavanaugh v. Conway, 36 R.I. 571, 90 Atl.
1080 (1914) (involved a "general" listing); 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance
§51 (1953).
See Lawrence v. Rhodes, 186 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900) where a provision for
liquidated damages upon default by the purchaser was coupled with a provision that should the purchaser so default the owner could not compel specific
performance, was held insufficient to meet a "sale" undertaking.
34. 272 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).

35. Cf. Kolodziejczak. v. Bak, 220 Mich. 274, 189 N.W. 929 (1922).
36. Davis v. Roseberry, 95 Kan. 411, 148 Pac. 629 (1915); Seidel v. Walker,
173 S.W. 1170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); cf. Meyer v. Peel, 218 Ark. 750, 238
S.W.2d 663 (1951) ("net" listing, Missouri law applied relying on McCormick
v. Obanion, 168 Mo. App. 606, 153 S.W. 267 (1913)).

37. Caneer v. Martin, 238 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Kittrell v.

Barbee, 198 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).

The failure of the property

owner to enforce the agreement in such case aided the court in reaching its
decision. See Wallace, supra note 2, at 310-13, 320-27, 346-47, 349.
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separated by the opinion in Wilson v. Frederick R. Ross Inv. Co.,38
which held that, no purchaser having been found prior to condemnation, the broker was not entitled to commission. In so doing the
court expressly distinguished the "condemnation to clear title" situation in which the New York court had allowed commission. 39
Has a "sale" been effected when a property owner has transferred
his property to a partnership in exchange for the rights of a partner
in the future profits of the partnership? Or, suppose a mortgagor
conveys the mortgaged real estate to the mortgagee in consideration
of the cancellation of the mortgaged debt and payment of debts of
the mortgagor? Would either of these transactions amount to a "sale"?
Returning to our definition of the term,40 would it be satisfied by a
transaction of the type first questioned above? There would clearly
be a contract to transfer property rights. But would this be done in
exchange for "money paid or promised to be paid," or for "any sort
of valuable consideration"? Would the right to future profits be recompense? "No," said the Pennsylvania Superior Court.4 1 But would
not this be some "sort of valuable consideration"? On the other
hand, the same Pennsylvania court has indicated that the facts of
the second question would give rise to a "sale."42 And the Missouri
court that formulated our definition expressly held, under the facts
with which the second question is posed, that a "sale" was present.4 3
The above discussion and the decisions giving rise to it are based on
the thought that the landowner, by entering the contract of sale, has,
"with his eyes open," accepted the purchaser. Before entering the
contract, it is posited, he should have investigated the purchaser's
position and it will be assumed that he did so satisfying himself of
the purchaser's ability to perform the contract. Thus, it is reasoned,
he should bear all risk that the sale might not be completed. Substantial authority exists, however, requiring the broker to do more
than merely secure a contract, as the dissent in the California case
immediately below insisted. This view is based on the idea that the
broker has impliedly undertaken to procure a purchaser of requisite
financial ability to complete the contract. This assumption, in turn,
is based on the belief that the broker ought to know the qualifications
of the person whom he presents to his principal and with whom he
38. 116 Colo. 249, 180 P.2d 226 (1947).

39. Tiffany Studios v. Seibert, 178 App. Div. 787, 166 N.Y. Supp. 304 (1917).
In general, see Annot., Condemnation of Property as Affecting Real Estate
Brokers' Right to Compensation, 170 A.L.R. 1422 (1947).
40. See text supported by note 19 supra.
41. McElhinney v. Belsky, 165 Pa. Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178 (1949).

42. John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A.2d 644 (1954)
(It was held that a "sale or exchange" undertaking was satisfied by a conveyance of property by a mortgagor to the mortgagee in consideration of a
cash payment and the cancellation of the mortgage and bond).
43. Schulte v. Crites, 300 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. App. 1957).
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asks the principal to deal. Thus, in jurisdictions accepting this
rationale, the burden is upon the broker to show that the purchaser
whom he claims to have produced was able, as well as ready and
44
willing, to complete the purchase upon the prescribed terms.
The foregoing discussion of the "sale" undertaking has proceeded
as though the competing rationales were mutually exclusive. A
moment's reflection, however, will lead to the conclusion that such
need not and should not be the case; determination of which is the
applicable rationale for a particular case should be dependent on the
listing terms and the context surrounding them. For example, the
initial commission provision may be found in a contract for sale not
containing acknowledgement that commission is owing. It seems
clear that, under such circumstances, a provision for commission on
the "sale" of property would require more than the contract of
which the commission provision is a part. And this without reference
to the rationale adopted by the particular court when dealing with a
commission provision executed prior to any brokerage activity. Of
course, pertinent language showing that more than a contract of sale
is contemplated may be used. Consideration of some terms which may
be thought to so provide will be considered later in this article.
Employment to Negotiate a Sale
Perhaps the language in Gilder v. DaviS45 best expresses the general
rule where a broker is employed "to negotiate" a sale. There the
court said,
The general rule is that where a broker employed to negotiate a sale
of real estate brings to his employer a responsible purchaser, willing to
buy upon the terms prescribed, he has earned his commission.... Where
the contract of sale is executed between the employer and the purchaser,
the right of the broker to his commissions46does not depend upon the performance of the contract by the purchaser.
And in a California case of the same vintage the majority of the
court adopted the same reasoning. This was done in the face of a
dissenting opinion which would require a binding contract of sale
or at least a written offer capable of specific performance against the
purchaser as in the "sale" provision already discussed.47 Usually,
44. See Snyder v. Fidler, 125 Iowa 378, 101 N.W. 130 (1904) (to sell or
trade merchandise), and cases discussed therein. See also Pratt v. Realty
Associates, Inc., 45 A.2d 478 (D.C. Munic. App. 1946) (applying Maryland
statutory law which placed Maryland within the rationale discussed at page
.... supra, but discussing previous Maryland decisions as well as those of the
District of Columbia).
English decisions are in accord with this view. See Martin v. Perry and
Daw, 47 L.T.R. (n.s.) 377 (K.B. 1931), relying on James v. Smith, reported
at 100 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 585 (1931).
45. 137 N.Y. 504, 33 N.E. 599 (1893).
46. 137 N.Y. at 506, 33 N.E. at 599.
47. Oullahan v. Baldwin, 100 Cal. 648, 35 Pac. 310 (1893).
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however, the result is reached without reference to the listing terms,
attention being focused on the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the
contract secured. 48

III. "DEAL" CLAUSES
Davenport49

Ball v.
is the authority most often relied upon as
giving the accepted legal definition of "deal." Actually, it but quoted
"the Webster dictionary definition of the word 'deal,' that it is 'an
arrangement to attain a desired result by a combination of interested
parties.'" But after admitting that "no doubt this correctly defines
'deal,'" the court acknowledged that the surrounding context would
determine just what the broker's undertaking-the "desired result"was. And further, "when reasonable minds may differ on which one
of two conclusions should be drawn from given facts, it is a jury
question ... [as to the actual undertaking of the broker]. '"50 There
a jury question was considered present in the face of a listing provision which provided for "payment of commission in the consummation
of said deal."'51 (Emphasis supplied.)
This has taken us to a consideration of other terms which may be
employed, not only in "deal" clauses, but in any given brokerage agreement and seems a clear indication that such "other terms" may
well hold the key to ascertainment of the broker's undertaking.52
The common terms which introduce a commission clause and which
are, by most courts, treated simply as a part of the broker's undertaking have been explained in another article; 53 but many others
remain, most of which will be discussed under individual headings
below.
48. Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900) ("If you effect a
sale").
49. 170 Iowa 33, 152 N.W. 69 (1915). Agreements for commission cast in
terms of payment for "negotiating" a deal or sale have been construed to
require more than the general "to find a purchaser" listing. If execution of
such an agreement precedes execution of a contract of sale or exchange
pursuant to such agreement, however, execution of the sale or exchange contract satisfies the broker's undertaking. Donahue v. Fuller, 5 S.W.2d 1037
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Where such a commission agreement is part of a
contract of sale or exchange consistent construction would seem to require
occurrence of some further event as a condition precedent to commission
earned unless such agreement is properly construable as an acknowledgement
that commission has been earned.
50. 170 Iowa at 41, 152 N.W. at 72 (1915).

51. Id. at 38, 152 N.W. at 71.
52. See division VI infra. See also Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery
Inv. Co., 94 Ore. 349, 184 Pac. 487 (1919) ("In the event that you find a
buyer ready and willing to consummate a deal" a commission based on the
sales price-would be paid, the broker to retain the sum "out of the first purchase money paid"); Flower v. Davidson, 44 Minn. 46, 46 N.W. 308 (1890).
53. See Wallace, supra note 2.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

IV. EXCHANGE

Where a broker has been employed to exchange property, the
courts have been inconsistent in their employment of the competing
rationales available. Perhaps the distinction between the rationales
can best be illustrated by utilizing decisions from the New York
courts-a distinction admittedly not always drawn by other courts.
The basis for the distinction was thus presented early:
It is one thing to agree with a broker to pay him a stipulated sum to
obtain from a third person a valid contract to make a prescribed exchange,
and another thing to agree to pay a fixed sum to effect or negotiate an
exchange which will vest in the employer a good title to designated lots.
Or in the language of the court in McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How., at
page 221:
"The broker must complete the sale-that is, he must find a purchaser
in a situation and ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms
agreed on-before he is entitled to his commissions. Then he will be
entitled to them, though the vendor refuse to go on and perfect the sale."
The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs were bound to prove, before
they rested their case, that the person procured by them to make the
exchange had a good, marketable title to the property he contracted to
give for the defendant's property. In a limited sense, this is so; but the
fact that such person executed a formal contract to convey carried with
it the legal presumption (which is proof in the first instance) that he was
able to perform his undertaking ....
The onus was thereby shifted upon
the defendant [listing owner] to prove that the title offered by such contracting party was for some reason defective.
We think the defendant became liable, irrespective of the question
whether he had good title or not. So long as the purchaserprocured by
the brokers had good title, they earned their brokerage when they produced him to the defendant, and he offered to make a binding contract
for the exchange. 54 (Emphasis supplied.)
By the foregoing statement the court emphasized three primary

considerations in determining what the broker's undertaking is where
he has been employed to exchange property: (1) the language variation by which the broker's undertaking is measured, (2) the effect
of the securing of a binding contract between the listing landowner
and third party, and (3) the non-release of the listing landowner from
liability where it is failure of his title which causes defeat of the
exchange. 55 Briefly discussing the first two of these considerations:
(1) The language variation by which the broker's undertaking is
measured. Granted this variation is semantically proper, is the
distinction meaningful to the average listing owner? The owner,
54. Moskowitz v. Hornberger, 20 Misc. 558, 46 N.Y. Supp. 462 (1897).
55. Another excellent statement of this concern is to be found in Bauman v.
Nevins, 52 App. Div. 290, 65 N.Y. Supp. 84 (1900).
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normally at least, is interested only in the exchange being completed
with effective exchange of his title for that of the third person.
Usually it is the broker who prepares the listing agreement. Should
such a distinction be available to him? Such a slight variation would
likely escape the owner's attention.
(2) The effect of the securing of a binding contract between the
listing landowner and third party. What has been said with regard to
the first consideration is equally applicable to the second. Here, as is
generally true throughout the entire brokerage area, the securing of a
contract (of exchange) is, as a general rule, considered sufficient.
However, the New York court, unlike those of many other jurisdictions,56 indicates that the securing of such a contract establishes only a
prima facie case for the broker, the burden "to prove 7 that the
title offered by such contracting party was for some reason defective"
being thereby shifted to the listing owner. 58
Actually, the New York court had decided earlier 59 that if the
listing were "ordinary," i.e., one employing a broker simply in reference to a sale or exchange, the broker was entitled to his commission
when the listing owner had accepted the other party to the exchange.
This same decision had also approved a companion instruction which
called for rejection of the broker's claim, in the absence of capricious
default by the listing owner, where the listing agreement provided
for commission only if the whole transaction went through. This
same decision further emphasized the central importance of the
specific listing language employed, as indicated by the quotation with
which this division began, when it said:
The question underlying all others in this case, and which is decisive
of it, is, was it the understanding of the parties to this action that the
plaintiffs [brokers] were not to be entitled to commissions unless mutual
conveyances of the property to be exchanged were made and accepted,
or whether they were entitled to commissions when the contract of
60
exchange was executed?

Even in the "ordinary" listing situation, however, execution of a
contract with a third person does not preclude the defense of lack of
title in the third person if the broker knew of the defect but
secreted the defect from the listing owner. 61 This is but an application
of the familiar agency concept concerning fidelity.
56. See text supported by notes 71-75 infra.
57. "Burden of producing evidence"?
58. Moskowitz v. Hornberger, 20 Misc. 558, 46 N.Y. Supp. 462, 464 (1897).

59. Kalley v. Baker, 132 N.Y. 1, 29 N.E. 1091 (1892) (by approval of instruc-

tions). See Slocum v. Ostrander, 141 App. Div. 380, 126 N.Y. Supp. 219 (1910).
But cf. Norman v. Reuther, 25 Misc. 161, 54 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1898).

60. Kalley v. Baker, 132 N.Y. at 3, 29 N.E. at 1092 (1892).
61. Wiley v. Kraslow Constr. Co., 141 App. Div. 706, 126 N.Y. Supp. 879
(1910).
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Now let us consider the cases from other jurisdictions, discussing
them under the same three headings set out in discussing the New
York cases above. A fourth consideration of crucial concern-when
was the commission agreement executed-will also be considered.
(1) The language variation by which the broker's undertaking is
measured.
In language similar to that of the New York court, an early annotation said, "In the case of a broker employed to procure an exchange
of property the courts have drawn a distinction between an engagement to 'effect an exchange' and to procure the execution of a contract for an exchange!"62 Ample authority existed in support of
the proposition.
Other listings exemplify the care with which particular listing
language must be considered. For example, a listing to get an exchange with the "owner" of certain property is not met when the
broker secures a contract with one who is not in fact owner of the
specified property. 63 And an agreement to pay commission "out of
the purchase money when the trade was closed and the deed made"
clearly requires more than execution of a contract of sale.6 4
Other decisions, however, are complex and require more extended
analysis. For example, in Snyder v. Fidler65 commission was to be
paid on condition that the broker "should effect a sale or exchange."
A contract of exchange was executed, but was not carried out. The
trial court instructed the jury that to recover his commissions the
broker had only to prove his employment, that he had brought the
listing owner and third party together, and that the negotiations
thus begun resulted in a written contract for the exchange of the
property. Further, if such were shown, the fact that the written contract had never been performed was immaterial, and would not
operate to defeat the broker's right of recovery. Acknowledging that
"the proposition of law thus stated finds more or less support in many
cases," and distinguishing earlier Iowa precedents, the Iowa Supreme
Court concluded that,
[T]he undertaking of a broker to effect an exchange of property was
not fully performed by producing a customer with whom an executory
contract of exchange was made, but never carried out, and commissions
could not be collected for such services unless it was further made to
appear that the failure to complete the deal was chargeable to the fault
or neglect of the principal ....
In other words, the principal having
obtained a valid and enforceable contract through the aid of the broker
62. Annot., 44 L.R.A. 612 (1899).
63. Henry v. Nelms, 113 Cal. App. 587, 298 Pac. 822 (1931).
64. Heath v. Huffhines, 152 S.W. 176, 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
65. 125 Iowa 378, 101 N.W. 130 (1904). Although this case involved brokerage to sell "merchandise," the court discusses and employs cases involving
real estate brokerage as authoritative.
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cannot arbitrarily or negligently refuse to avail himself of its benefits, and
thus avoid paying the promised commission. But the term "enforceable
contract," as here employed, means something more than a contract of
legal validity, the violation of which will afford a cause of action. It is a
contract which can be so enforced as to give to the principal the property,

or the money, or the profit, or other advantage for which he bargained.66

In Illinois the early decision in Wilson v. Mason67 set a difficult
course, but one that seems eminently sensible. Although not itself
dealing with an exchange situation, it has been consistently applied
in such situations, as well as in nearly all other brokerage matters. In
the Wilson case the court found that the agreement between the
broker and landowner was that if the broker's proposed customer
took the premises in question, the broker would be paid a conunission.
A written contract was entered into by the listing owners with
the executors of an estate, the broker's customer. The executors
subsequently refused to consummate the deal. The listing owners
were unable to secure performance of the agreement because it was
not mutually obligatory on the parties thereto. Under these circumstances the court held that the broker's agreement provided for
a sale of the premises to entitle him to commission; and without the
owner's fault no sale having been made and no enforceable contract
of sale having been entered into, the broker had not performed his
agreement and no commissions could be recovered. In Davis v.
Pauler,68 after discussing many earlier cases with special emphasis
on the Wilson decision, the Illinois Court of Appeals said,
[The broker] produced a purchaser who was accepted by the defendant
and with whom she entered into a contract. She was not bound to accept
the same without a reasonable opportunity to enquire and satisfy herself
as to same . . . and she is therefore not in a position to take advantage of
a want of title in the party whom she accepted and entered into a contract
with, in order to defeat the plaintiffs' claim for commission, unless she

first shows that she was ready to perform the said contract of exchange
on her part....69 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, both the Iowa and Illinois cases above referred to, as well
as almost all others, immediately combine the ingredients of the
second consideration:
(2) The effect of the securing of a binding contract between the
listing landowner and third party.
By reference to the Iowa and Illinois decisions immediately above,
two means of reaching the same result will be noted. The Iowa court,
dealing with in "effect an exchange" listing, rejected execution of a
66. Id. at 383, 101 N.W. at 132.
67. 57 Ill. App. 325 (1894), ajFd,158 M. 304,42 N.E. 134 (1895).
68. 170 Ill. App. 317 (1912).

69. Id. at 322.
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contract as sufficient unless an "enforceable contract," as there defined,70 resulted. If such was secured, the broker would be entitled
to his commission though the listing landowner arbitrarily or
negligently refused to enforce the contract. But the third party must
have been bound so that the listing landowner could, if he so desired,
secure the advantage for which he had bargained. The Illinois court,
in different language, apparently reached the same result, but placed
an affirmative duty on the landowner to show as part of his case-inchief that he is ready to perform.
As a general rule, cases not involved with an "effect the exchange"
undertaking have found execution of a contract sufficient. Thus, a
broker employed to "get" an exchange has earned the promised commission when a contract of exchange has been entered. 71 Similarly,
a broker to "negotiate" or "secure" an exchange is entitled to his
commission when an exchange contract is executed even though the
contract is never performed, 72 and even though such non-performance
results from mutual rescission. 3 And, contrary to the effect of the
Iowa and Illinois cases cited above, this result follows although it
is the third person only who is in default 74-- unless the broker knows
75
of the third person's inability.

(3) Nonrelease of the listing landowner from liability for commission where it is failure of his title that causes defeat of the
exchange.
Paraphrasing what had been said in Conkling v. Krakauer,76 the
Texas Commission of Appeals in W. A. Lucas & Co. v. Thompso 7 7 set
down in dictum the accepted rule in the situation posed:
[I]n the absence of specific representations, alleged to have been made
as to the title, the listing of land with a broker for sale, under the circumstances stated in that case, carried with it an implied representation that
the owner had a good merchantable title thereto ....
The principle, stated another way, is that where the owner of land holds
himself out as having a good title, and the broker procures a purchaser
of the land and brings the seller and the purchaser together, and a definite
and binding contract is entered into between them, to consummate the
sale upon the terms and price agreed to by the seller, if the title is good,
70. Snyder v. Fidler, 125 Iowa 378, 384, 101 N.W. 130, 132 (1904).

71. Vickery v. Valdez, 113 Cal. App. 135, 298 Pac. 151 (1931); Johnson v.

Powers, 188 Okla. 508, 111 P.2d 191 (1941).
72. Rucker v. Hubler, 56 Cal. App. 771, 206 Pac. 472 (1922); Briley v.
Keltner, 41 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
73. Bailey v. James, 95 Cal. App. 12, 272 Pac. 339 (1928).
74. Lockwood v. Halsey, 41 Kan. 166, 21 Pac. 98 (1889); Roche v. Smith,
176 Mass. 595, 58 N.E. 152 (1900); Keinath, Schuster & Hudson v. Reed, 18
N. M. 358, 137 Pac. 841 (1913).
75. W. A. Lucas & Co. v. Thompson, 29 S.W.2d 1024 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930),
affirming 15 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
76. 70 Tex. 735, 11 S.W. 117 (1888).
77. 29 S.W.2d 1024 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
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the broker is entitled to his commission, although no sale be effected, because of a defect in the title.78

(4) Effect of consideration of the time at which the commission
agreement was executed.
A 1920 California Appeals decision sets up the crucial considerations
here. That court distinguished Ketcham v. Axelsoni in that in the
Ketcham case the broker's commission agreement was separate
whereas in the case under discussion it was a part of the contract of
exchange. Further, in Ketcham, "The [broker's] . . . contract for

compensation antedated the exchange agreement. . .. His contract
for compensation, not being a part of the exchange contract, was in no
way affected by its terms or by subsequent mutual cancellation. 80
Let us note first that in Ketcham the broker's compensation agreement was an independent instrument which antedated the exchange
agreement. Thus, under the rationale outlined immediately above,
at the time the contract of exchange was executed the broker had performed his "to procure a purchaser" undertaking. When the commission agreement does not antedate the contract of exchange,
however, the rationale is inapplicable. In such a situation the courts
have generally considered the contract of exchange as governing and,
in the absence of language contained therein to the effect that commission was payable, 81 have felt the parties could not have intended
78. Id. at 1026. See also Gauthier v. West, 45 Minn. 192, 47 N.W. 656 (1891).
The Texas Supreme Court had earlier determined, concerning a "to sell"
situation, however, that an optional contract was sufficient where the listing
owner's title proved defective. In rejecting the landowner's argument that a
"to sell" listing combined with a "net" provision was not met by a contract
containing an option, that court said:
"There would be more force in this if the title had proved satisfactory,

and [the purchaser] . . .had exercised his right to recede from the trade

by forfeiting the money deposited. In such case there would have been
neither a willingness to buy nor an enforceable contract to buy, one or the
other of which conditions would be essential to the broker's right to
compensation. But the latter condition is not essential where the first
exists and the sale is defeated by the owner of the property. The question
whether or not the [broker] . .. performed the service called for by the
contract is not wholly dependent upon the writing executed between the
owners of the property and the proposed purchaser. The fact that the
latter really was willing and able to buy, and would have bought notwithstanding he was at liberty not to do so, had he not been prevented by
the defendants' failure to produce proper evidence of title, must be
regarded as controlling, and as dispensing with the necessity of a binding
contract to purchase .... The case differs from those in which there is
no evidence of the rendering of the service by the broker but the granting
of an option to the so-called purchaser, in the fact that a purchaser was
found by [the broker] .... a sale to whom was prevented only by the
fault of the owner." Hamburger & Dreyling v. Thomas, 103 Tex. 280, 126
S.W. 561-562 (1910).
79. 160 Iowa 456, 142 N.W. 62 (1913).
80. Houghton v. Kuehnrich, 46 Cal. App. 469, 475, 189 Pac. 457, 459 (1920).
81. Hamnons v. English, 129 Ore. 511, 277 Pac. 823 (1929); cf. Rabinowitz
v. North Texas Realty Co., 270 S.W. 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). But cf. Friestedt v. Dietrich, 84 Ill. App. 604 (1899).
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the incorporating contract to constitute performance by the broker.82
Let us note second that the quotation with which this division
began emphasized that the commission provision was not a part of the
contract of exchange; therefore, it would not be affected by events
bearing on such contract. Suppose the only commission agreement
is a part of the contract for exchange and something has occured to
eliminate that contract? Will such also result in defeat of the brokerage provision? Without more an affirmative answer seems clear, and
such is the accepted rule.83 To be distinguished is the situation in
which the contract of exchange of which the commission agreement
is a part is for some reason unenforceable. Here, the "contract" still
exists and the brokerage provision may be enforced although the
main contract may not.84 Similarly, if the court can find an acknowledgment that the broker has earned a commission it would seem
that casualty to the seller-buyer contract should be immaterial
insofar as obligation to pay commission is concerned.8 5
V. NET
No discussion of the real estate broker's undertaking would be
complete without reference to the "net" provision. However, the
significant considerations concerning such listings have been concisely
and expertly stated.8 6 This discussion will accordingly be quite restricted.
Definition of the term "net" in a leading law dictionary, "with all
deductions, such as charges, expenses, discounts, commissions, taxes,
etc.; free from expenses,1 87 tells us what "net" means, but fails to
suggest what the broker's undertaking prescribed by a listing employing the term is. In ascertaining this in a particular instance, the
courts' attitudes concerning such listings as well as distinction between two distinct listing forms become of paramount importance.
Judicial attitude in this situation begins with dislike for "net" agreements. Just why this should be the case is conjectural, but it is
believed the following is adequately supported by the decisions.
While construction of a listing agreement is normally against the
broker, such results from the fact that usually it is he who has
82. Brion v. Cahill, 34 Cal. App. 258, 165 Pac. 704 (1917); Kolodziejczak v.
Bak, 220 Mich. 274, 189 N.W. 929 (1922). It is not unusual to find additional
words employed which clearly connote a condition. See, e.g., Nutting & Co.
v. Kennedy, 16 Ga. App. 569, 85 S.E. 767 (1915); Appleby v. Dysinger, 137
Minn. 382, 163 N.W. 739 (1917).
83. K. Lundeen Corp. v. Barlow, 120 Cal. App. 391, 7 P.2d 1102 (1932).
84. Richey v. Bolton, 18 Wash.2d 522, 140 P.2d 253 (1943).
85. See Wallace, note 2 supra.

86. 3 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 768 (1951).
87. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (3d ed. 1933).

(Emphasis added.)
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authored the agreement. 88 Where there is a "net" listing, however,
the agreement will normally have resulted from the landowner's
insistence.89 Thus, he will be the "maker" against whom construction
generally runs. So, the courts begin with construction against the
existence of a "net" agreement. Thus, in Palmtag v. Danielson90°
where a price of $40,000 was set and an agreement to pay "a 5% commission on a price of $40,000 or a net to me of $38,000" was executed,
the court concluded a general listing9' was present rather than one
of a "net" character. Reference to a "net" figure was considered
merely illustrative of the amount the owner would receive if the
property were sold at $40,000. This construction meant that the
broker was entitled to a 5% commission on a subsequent sale at
$35,000 whereas a "net" construction would have meant the broker
was entitled to nothing. A "net" construction, however, is open where
the facts justify it even though the brokerage agreement itself does
not utilize the term. Thus, where a listing simply contains a price
for the listed property with no statement concerning commission, fair
construction dictates a construction of "net."9 2
Concerning the listing distinctions, first must be considered the
listing in which a landowner promises a broker only that he will
convey the listed realty to a purchaser on receipt of a specified price
"net." In such a case, no commission has been promised by the landowner and no action for commission lies against him. That is, if the
broker is to receive a commission it must result from the willingness
of the purchaser to pay more than the "net" price.93 In such a case,
the landowner is concerned with neither the final price the purchaser
agrees to pay beyond the "net" nor with the identity of the purchaser.9 4 The second situation is that wherein the landowner promises
the broker all that the landowner receives from the property over a
stated "net" amount as commission.95 As applied to the brokerage sit88. Pate v. Goyne, 212 Ark. 51, 204 S.W.2d 900 (1947); Boggess Realty Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ky. 813, 14 S.W.2d 140 (1929); Werner v. Eurich, 263 App. Div. 744,
31 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1941); Wilson v. Franklin, 282 Pa. 189, 127 Atl. 609 (1925);
Campbell v. Swallow, 50 R.I. 467, 149 Atl. 254 (1930); Hamrick v. Cooper
River Lumber Co., 223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E.2d 575 (1953). But cf. Munro, The Real
Estate Broker and His Commissions, 1 Wyo. L. J. 174 (1947).
89. Unless the owner is insistent upon a "net" contract, the broker with
whom the property has been listed will simply add the amount of his commission to the owner's price and thus arrive at the "asking" price.
90. 30 Cal.2d 517, 183 P.2d 265 (1947).
91. See division I, supra.
92. McKibben v. Wilson, 105 Kan. 200, 182 Pac. 638 (1919); cf. Fisher v.
Rodahl, 196 Minn. 409, 265 N.W. 43 (1936).
93. Sexton v. Simondet, 97 Cal. App. 2d 894, 218 P.2d 1021 (1950); Wolverton
v. Tuttle, 51 Ore. 501, 94 Pac. 961 (1908).
94. McKibben v. Wilson, 105 Kan. 200, 182 Pac. 638 (1919); Canfield v.
Orange, 13 N.D. 622, 102 N.W. 313 (1905).
95. 3 CoRBin, CONTRACTS § 768 (1951).
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uation, the dictionary definition quoted above 96 seems to make receipt
of the price by the owner a condition precedent to his duty to the
broker. Such has been the formula most often stated by the courts
in fact.97 Some of the courts, however, have not required actual
receipt of the price but have considered the broker to have earned
his commission upon having negotiated a contract between landowner
and purchaser which is capable of being specifically enforced. 98
Most jurisdictions consider a wrongful refusal to convey by the
landowner an elimination of the condition. 99 Even when this is rejected, however, the distinction between listing terms is of critical
import. Thus, in Ripley v. Taft00 where the landowner spoke only of
the price he required, not caring what the broker made above that
price, the Massachusetts court held that where a contract had been
executed for a sum above the "net" price the broker was entitled to
his commission although the sale failed because of the landowner's
default. But in Munroe v. Taylor'0 ' where the landowner agreed to
pay the broker a commission "out of the price any surplus beyond the
amount stipulated which the defendant was to receive," the broker
was not entitled to a commission where the sale did not take placethe reason for the failure being immaterial-even though it may have
been that the owner failed to perform.
VI. MISCELLANY
In this division the significance ascribed to many terms employed in
commission agreements, sometimes as a part of the broker's undertaking itself, sometimes as part of the payment clause, will be discussed. Whichever provision is involved the meaning of the term
will, in most jurisdictions, designate the broker's undertaking in fact.
96. See text supported by note 87 supra.
97. See, e.g., Martinson v. Hensler, 132 Minn. 437, 157 N.W. 714, 715 (1916),
where the distinction between the effect of the broker's having secured execution of a contract between the landowner and a purchaser in a "net" case and
that of a non-net case where a contract of sale suffices although not capable
of being specifically enforced is delineated.
98. See 3 CORBN, CONTRACTS § 768 (1951). Felthauser v. Greeble, 100 Neb.
652, 160 N.W. 983 (1916), illustrates the minority view. There, relying on
cases involving a "sale" undertaking, the court determined that a contract of
sale was sufficient.
99. See, e.g., Neilson v. Lee, 60 Cal. 555 (1882); Jones v. Hedstrom, 89 Kan.
294, 131 Pac. 145 (1913); Close v. Redelius, 67 Nev. 158, 215 P.2d 659 (1950).
See Schramsky v. Hollmichel, 233 Minn. 481, 486, 47 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1951).
The broker can rely on the listing owner having good title to the listed property, and is entitled to his commission where failure of the owner's title causes
defeat of the transaction. See, e.g., R. J. & B. F. Camp Lumber Co. v. Tedder,
78 Fla. 183, 82 So. 865 (1919); United Sales Agency v. Luck Land Co., 154
Minn. 332, 191 N.W. 897 (1923); Nesbit v. Helser, 49 Mo. 383 (1872),
100. 253 Mass. 490, 149 N.E. 311 (1925).
101. 191 Mass. 483, 78 N.E. 106 (1906).

1960]

REAL ESTATE BROKERS

A. Consurmmation
Reference has previously been made to the importance of use of
this term in a brokerage agreement, but just what that importance
is remains for discussion. Simply put, "consummate" in this context
means "delivery of a deed of conveyance from the vendor to the
vendee."'1 02 While such a definition may suffice in many situations,
however, it is a gross oversimplification. More adequate is the dictionary definition "to finish by completing what was intended; bring or
carry to utmost point or degree; carry or bring to completion; finish;
perfect; fulfill; achieve.' 1 03 But even this is inadequate for "consummation is a word whose meaning changes, depending upon the
circumstances in which it is used.' 10 4
What are "circumstances" such as to change the meaning of the
term? Of primary import are the time and place in which the provision is found. Here a discussion of cases from one jurisdiction
involving pertinent time and place provisions will best serve to
illustrate our thesis. Thus, in McGill v. Fleming'05 the California
Court of Appeals by way of dictum in a case involving a leasehold
indicated that a sale would be "consummated" if a valid and binding
lease were executed, the same requirement as in a simple "sale"
undertaking. Later, in a full discussion of the problem, the court
specifically pointed out that the case then under discussion could not
be similarly disposed of because the listing agreement there involved
had been "specially prepared after negotiation, [and had] provided
'in the event of consummation of the sale' a commission was to be
paid, the first payment to be 'at the close of escrow."' "Therefore,"
said the court, "two events, unless they should occur simultaneously,
had to come to pass before liability was to arise.' 10 6 Still another
07
variation had been considered much earlier. In Levy v. Dusenbery
a broker who was attempting to negotiate an exchange got the defendant and another to agree to an exchange. The defendant then
signed an employment contract promising to pay a commission "upon
102. Beattie-Firth, Inc. v. Colebank, 105 S.E.2d 5, 9 (W. Va. 1958).
103. BLACK, LAW DicTioNARY 389 (4th ed. 1951). See also AIERRrm-WEzsMR,
NEW INERNATiONAL DiCTiONARY 573 (2d ed. 1955); Kay v. Sperling, 83 So.2d
881 (Fla. 1955).
104. Podany v. Erickson, 235 Vinn. 36, 40, 49 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1951). Contra,
Jenkins v. Hollingsworth & Tabor, 83 IlM. App. 139 (1898) ("if the broker
found a purchaser or traded" treated the same as a provision for commission
"when the trade was consummated"--both mean "that commissions were due
only when [the broker] should produce a purchaser who was ready, able and
willing to complete the purchase or exchange").
105. 32 Cal. App. 2d 601, 90 P.2d 341 (1939).
106. Cochran v. Ellsworth, 126 Cal. App. 2d 429, 439, 272 P.2d 904, 910
(1954). See also Peak v. Jurgens, 5 Cal. App. 2d 573, 43 P.2d 569 (1935);
Alison v. Chapman, 36 Cal. App. 759, 173 Pac. 389 (1918). But cf. Turner v.
Watkins, 36 Cal. App. 503, 172 Pac. 620 (1918).
107. 32 Cal. App. 411, 163 Pac. 231 (1916).
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the consummation of the exchange [within 24 hours]." Since a
period of thirty days was allotted for the parties to search title, it
was "quite apparent" to the court "that the words 'consummation
of said exchange of properties' as used in this writing refer, not to the
final exchange of deeds, but to the execution and delivery of a binding
contract for their exchange .... "108 The court correctly reasoned that
the parties could not contemplate an exchange taking place within
24 hours when thirty days had been given to search title.
Similar emphasis on the circumstances as determinative of the
meaning of consummate was expressed by the Oregon court in
Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co.10 9 In that case the
commission agreement provided for commission "in the event that
you find a buyer ready and willing to consummate a deal" with the
broker being authorized to retain it out of the first purchase money
paid. The court listed many cases involving the term "consummate,"
some, including one earlier Oregon decision" 0 holding that a contract of sale or exchange satisfied the requirement,"' some requiring
a completed transfer," 2 and concluded that which result was correct
in a given case depended entirely upon the circumstances. Then,
concerning the case presently before it, the court felt that the provision for retention out of the price coupled with "to consummate
the deal" showed a completed sale was contemplated and must 1mean
3
one where the actual transfer of the property was completed.
108. Id. at 415, 163 Pac. at 233.
109. 94 Ore. 349, 184 Pac. 487 (1919).
110. Wolverton v. Tuttle, 51 Ore. 501, 94 Pac. 961 (1908).
111. Purcell v. Firth, 175 Cal. 746, 167 Pac. 379 (1917); Shainwald v. Cady,
92 Cal. 83, 28 Pac. 101 (1891); Turner v. Watkins, 36 Cal. App. 503, 172 Pac.
620 (1918); Shephard-Teague Co. v. Hermann, 12 Cal. App. 394, 107 Pac. 622
(1910); Micks v. Stevenson, 22 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E. 492 (1898); Ormsby v.
Graham, 123 Iowa 202, 98 N.W. 724 (1904); Rice v. Mayo, 107 Mass. 550 (1871);
Clark v. Battaglia, 47 Pa. Super. 290 (1911).
112. Conner v. Riggins, 21 Cal. App. 756, 132 Pac. 849 (1913); Goodwin v.
Siemen, 106 Minn. 368, 118 N.W. 1008 (1908). The court also suggested to
the reader that he see Nutting & Co. v. Kennedy, 16 Ga. App. 569, 85 S.E.
767 (1915); Ball v. Davenport, 170 Iowa 33, 40, 152 N.W. 69 (1915); Flower
v. Davidson, 44 Minn. 46, 46 N.W. 308 (1890); Morse v. Conley, 83 N.J.L. 416,
85 Atl. 196 (1912); Gaut v. Dunlap, 188 S.W. 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
113. Although the court here was requiring completion of contract by
transfer of the property, Porizky v. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 178 S.W.2d
157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), relying on the Oregon Home Builders decision,
note 109 supra, held that "to consummate" would be met by a contract capable

of specific performance. See also Armstrong v. Payne, 233 S.W. 139 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921).
"In interpreting the term 'consummation' as used in listing agreements
generally, the New Jersey courts have 'played the intention' of the
parties to a high degree. Thus, in two cases in which the brokerage provision was found in the contract of sale, the New Jersey court has indicated
that a 'sale' is 'consummated' when the owner and purchaser enter a
contract of sale unless the intention of the parties otherwise is clearly
expressed. [Hatch v. Dayton, 130 N.J.L. 425, 33 A.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1943);.
Morse v. Conley, 83 N.J.L. 416, 85 Atl. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1912)]. This was
accomplished by drawing a distinction between a provision for payment
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B. Complete, Close, Dispose, Settlement
Cases abound in which the presence of any one or more of these
terms has, in the context in which they were found, been considered
to state a condition precedent to the owner's liability for commission.
A few express the undertaking required where such terms are employed. Thus, Stanton v. Carnahan"4 defined "complete" as "the
vesting of title in the buyer and the payment of the purchase price
or the delivery of evidences of obligation therefor." Similarly, a
deal has been "closed" when deeds executed pursuant to it have been
delivered. 1 5 And, to "dispose of" property requires actual transfer of
6
title by seller to purchaser and is not satisfied by a contract of sale."
Each case must, however, stand alone for the circumstances of each
will be determinative.
This last sentence must be studiously applied in all cases where the
meaning of the terms employed is to be considered. As the Pennsylvania court stated with regard to the term "settlement,"
Under the circumstances here appearing, the words "at settlement" are
ambiguous in meaning. The trial judge says they mean "at [the time
fixed by the agreement of sale for] settlement." Though this is a possible
construction of them, it seems to us their normal meaning is "at [the time
of actual] settlement;" and evidently plaintiff thought this was the time
intended .... A familiar instance will illustrate our conclusion as to the
usual meaning of the words. Many, if not most, agreements of sale provide
that the balance of the purchase price shall be paid "at settlement," which,
in that connection, always means "at the time of actual settlement,"
though it is also contemplated that this will take place at the date named
in the agreement for such actual settlement. In the instant case, as in all
others where ambiguous language is used, evidence "is properly received,
not to vary the writing, but to explain the meaning of doubtful
terms

....

"117

VII. CONCLUSION
There would be little value in an exhaustive treatment of the subject of the real estate broker and his commissions both because the
of a commission 'at the time of consummation' and one providing for
payment 'for consummating this sale.' Commission was denied in the
former case because the court felt that the language 'spoke in futuro.'
Recovery was allowed in the latter instance because the provision was
thought not to provide a clear indication of a contrary intent. [In the
present case the words "for consummating this sale" do not necessarily
refer to any future event and can just as well refer to an accomplished
fact, as far as the words of the contract are concerned. Hatch v. Dayton,
130 N.J.L. 425, 427, 33 A.2d 350, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1943)]. Here again, the
strong preference for a 'time' rationale is manifested." Wallace, note 2
supra, at 306.
114. 15 Cal. App. 527, 115 Pac. 339 (1911).
115. Gaut v. Dunlap, 188 S.W. 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
116. Cf. Greusel v. Dean, 98 Iowa 405, 67 N.W. 275 (1896).
117. Simon v. Myers, 284 Pa. 3, 8, 130 Atl. 256, 258 (1925).
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broad principles involved have been accorded a high degree of solidity
and because any litigated brokerage problem requires individualized
treatment. Enough should be presented, however, to acquaint the
reader with the major areas of brokerage litigation. As a result of
these conflicting considerations, the foregoing discussion has included
discussion of general brokerage principles in some detail, and has also
attempted, by reference to specific judicial handling, to suggest the
considerations which will and should be applied in the determination
of specific problems. The philosophy underlying presentation of this
material, therefore, is the desire to present material which may be
helpful by way of analogy and illustration in the determination of
similar problems. But it must be acknowledged that however similar
the "contracts"' ' 8 "may appear, the decision as to each must depend
on the consideration of the language of the particular contract, read
in the light of the material circumstances of the parties in view of
which the contract is made.""19
118. See Wallace, note 1 supra,at 354.
119. POWELL, AGENcy 280 (1952), quoting from Luxor (Eastbourne), Ltd. v.
Cooper, [1941] A.C. 108, 130.

